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In his contribution to this volume, Shaun Gallagher casts a sharply focussed 
critical eye over positions which claim that action is to be explained, in part, by 
appeal to minimal representations. One of the positions to come under fire in this 
way is a view that I developed in my book Reconstructing the Cognitive World 
(Wheeler, 2005). In this brief response I shall try to defend my own brand of 
representational minimalism against some of Gallagher’s worries.  
 
Following an analysis of the minimalist’s commitments, Gallagher offers a six-
point negative characterization of minimal representation, that is, six things that 
minimal representations are (apparently) not. They are not (1) wholly internal, (2) 
discrete, identifiable, enduring things, (3) passive, (4) decoupleable, (5) strongly 
instructional, or (6) homuncular. The minimalist’s aim is to pare down the 
concept of representation so as to render it suitable for the explanation of real-
time action. Gallagher’s analysis suggests that, in pursuing this goal, the 
minimalist divests the concept of representation of properties 1-6. But, argues 
Gallagher, properties 1-6 are the very properties that, in some combination, make 
a concept a genuinely representational one. So, because minimal representations 
possess none of these properties, “the idea of a minimal representation no longer 
conforms to the criteria that would make it a representation” (Gallagher, this 
volume). In the end, then, minimal representations are not representations at all.  
 
Let’s call properties 1-6 Gallagher-properties. One way for the minimalist to 
respond to the challenge here would be to show that the states or processes that 
are candidates for minimal representation-hood do, pace Gallagher, possess one 
or more (the more the better) Gallagher-properties. In my way of thinking, 
minimal representation is action-oriented representation, where an action-
oriented representation is one that is (i) action-specific (tailored to a particular 
behaviour and designed to represent the world in terms of specifications for 
possible actions), (ii) egocentric (features bearer-relative content as epitomized by 
spatial maps in an egocentric co-ordinate system), and (iii) intrinsically context-
dependent (the explicit representation of context is eschewed in favour of situated 
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special-purpose adaptive couplings that implicitly define the context of activity 
in their basic operating principles). (For a worked-through example of action-
oriented representation that illustrates these features, see the discussion of 
Franceschini et al.’s (1992) ‘fly robot’ in my paper in this volume.) Given this 
characterization of minimal representation, I agree without qualification that 
such elements do not possess Gallagher-properties 3 and 5. Moreover, since the 
relationship between decoupleability (Gallagher-property 4) and representation 
seems to get murkier every time I think about it, and since I am at least 
convinced that decoupleability is not necessary for minimal representation (see 
Wheeler, 2005), I propose to ignore that issue for today. (The properties of 
decoupleability and being strongly instructional will, however, crop up again, in 
relation to different points.) That leaves three Gallagher-properties to be 
discussed.  
 
As Gallagher observes, my account of representation is based, in part, on what I 
call the neural assumption, which states that if intelligent action is to be explained 
in representational terms, then whatever criteria are proposed as sufficient 
conditions for representation-hood, they should not be satisfied by any extra-
neural elements for which it would be unreasonable, extravagant, or 
explanatorily inefficacious to claim that the contribution to intelligent action 
made by those elements is representational in character. The justification for the 
neural assumption is largely methodological. It seems likely that neural states 
and processes do something that is, for the most part, psychologically distinctive, 
and we expect the concept of representation to help us explain how that 
something comes about. Thus there is a clear sense in which action-oriented 
representation is overwhelmingly brain-bound.  
 
It does not follow from the neural assumption that, despite what I said earlier, 
minimal representation is, in some covert way, strongly instructional in 
character, that is, fully determinative of the behavioural outcome to which it 
contributes (Gallagher-property 5). The neural assumption as stated allows that 
non-representational causal contributions by the non-neural body and the 
external environment, to the fine-grained structure of intelligent action, may go 
beyond that of mere background conditions for processes of internal, 
representation-driven control. This point also clarifies the sense in which 
“Wheeler… [suggests]… that minimal representations involve aspects of a 
system that is brain, body… but also environment” (Gallagher, this volume). 
According to me, minimal representations involve factors in the non-neural body 
and the environment in the sense that the behavioural outcomes that the neurally 
located representational elements support will depend also on non-trivial causal 
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contributions from extra-neural factors. In most cases, however, those extra-
neural factors will not themselves qualify as the vehicles of the representation 
itself. Another conclusion that does not follow from the neural assumption is that 
the cognitive is restricted to the neural. For one thing the neural assumption is 
liberal enough to allow some external factors (e.g. road-signs, certain linguistic 
structures) to qualify as representations in the sense relevant for cognitive-
scientific explanation. For another, unless one identifies the cognitive with the 
representational, a move which, as Gallagher’s discussion elegantly 
demonstrates, would be a mistake, then the neural may do something that is, for 
the most part, distinctive and distinctively representational, within the class of 
contributions that count as cognitive. So, for all the neural assumption says, the 
extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers, 1998) might still be true.  
 
What does all this tell us? Gallagher claims that the fans of minimal 
representation want to do without Gallagher-property 1, that is, full internality. 
Evidence for this claim may be found in the work of, for example, Rowlands 
(2006) who holds that the vehicles of representation extend into the environment. 
However, the sense in which I agree that minimal representations are not fully 
internal is heavily qualified. For my endorsement of the neural assumption means 
that I do expect the overwhelming majority of minimal representations to be 
spatially located inside the agent – indeed, inside the brain. The extra-neural 
factors that qualify as minimal representations are essentially friendly interlopers 
into what is largely an inner sanctum. And since I think that if one’s theory of 
representation permits regular violations of the neural assumption, one simply 
doesn’t have a good enough theory of representation, I treat compliance with the 
neural assumption, and thus with a qualified internality constraint, as precisely 
the kind of criterion for representation-hood that Gallagher’s negative 
characterization suggests that I should not. This enables me to place some 
distance between my own view and the claim that minimal representations do 
not possess Gallagher-property 1.  
 
Do minimal representations possess Gallagher-property 2, that of being discrete, 
identifiable, enduring things?  Recall that, for me, minimal representations are 
context-dependent egocentric control structures for situation-specific actions. I 
see no reason to think that such structures couldn’t be discrete or identifiable, but 
could they be enduring? It is true that some flagship examples of minimal 
representations (e.g. the ‘built-on-the-fly’ snap maps discussed in my paper in 
this volume) enjoy only a transient existence as temporary structures built in the 
heat of real-time action. But others, it seems, may be stored structures that 
endure over time. For example, Mataric’s sonar-driven mobile robot Toto 
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(Mataric, 1991), mentioned by Gallagher, deploys a navigational system that uses 
minimal (action-oriented) representations of spatial landmarks. The landmarks 
in question are encoded in terms of patterns of sensorimotor activity. Thus, if 
Toto keeps detecting proximally located objects on its right hand side, while its 
compass bearing remains unchanged, then a ‘right-wall’ is internally encoded, 
not as some objective entity, but in terms of the robot’s sensorimotor ‘experience’ 
at the time. Histories of these structured sensorimotor ‘experiences’ are stored as 
connected nodes in a distributed graph. Later, using this graph, paths through 
the environment may be encoded as navigation-supporting sequences of past, 
current, and expected ‘experiences’. Thus, whatever I may have inadvertently 
suggested in the past by concentrating my discussion on minimal representations 
whose existence is short-lived, there is reason to reject the claim that minimal 
representations could not be enduring things and so fail to possess Gallagher-
property 2. Some minimal representations are transient structures – that’s surely 
right – but some, it seems, endure.  
 
Finally let’s consider Gallagher-property 6, homuncularity. In my view systemic 
homuncularity is necessary for subagential representation, so minimal 
representations will certainly be associated with that property (Wheeler, 2005). A 
system is homuncular when (a) it can be compartmentalized into a set of 
hierarchically organized communicating modules, and (b) each of those modules 
performs a well-defined sub-task that contributes towards the collective 
achievement of the overall adaptive solution. Gallagher’s first critical strategy 
here is to suggest that the very notion of homuncularity is conceptually 
problematic. He writes: homuncularity “seems to be something similar to Clark 
and Grush’s emulator [see Gallagher’s paper for a description of this model] sans 
decoupleability. At the same time it is not clear what off-line but not decoupled 
means…“ (Gallagher, this volume). In order to see what is going on here, we 
need to understand how the concept of decoupleability is related to the on-line-
off-line distinction.  
 
An element or mechanism realizes the property of decoupleability just when the 
system in which it figures has been designed precisely so that that element or 
mechanism may become activated in the absence of its usual eliciting stimuli. In 
general terms, on-line intelligence is characterized by the production of fluid and 
flexible real-time adaptive responses to incoming sensory stimuli (e.g. playing 
squash, avoiding a predator). By contrast, off-line intelligence is characterized by 
thinking that is disengaged from the ongoing flow of perception and action (e.g. 
mentally planning one’s squash match strategies, reflecting on the quality of the 
beer in Munich while sitting on a bus in Edinburgh). Given these definitions 
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Gallagher is right, of course, that decoupleability is necessary for off-line 
processing, and that explains why “it is not clear what off-line but not decoupled 
means”. Nevertheless, none of this seems to present any sort of problem for 
homuncular analysis. So why does Gallagher think otherwise? He seems to 
assume that if a system is homuncular then it involves off-line processing. If that 
were true then of course there would be a problem in cases where putatively 
homuncular systems do not realize the property of decoupleability. But why 
think that homuncularity results in cognitive processing that is necessarily off-
line? Indeed, recall the previously mentioned fly robot. There is no sense in 
which the homuncular states and processes that underlie the generation of real-
time adaptive navigation by this robot are disengaged from the ongoing flow of 
perception and action. Indeed, they are intimately embedded in that flow. In 
short, they are on-line. But now since the homuncular states and processes in 
question are on-line, there is no tension with the idea that they do not realize 
decoupleability. In sum, the notion of homuncularity appears to be in good 
conceptual order.  
 
Gallagher proceeds to suggest that even if we can make conceptual sense of 
homuncular systems, and thus potentially of minimal representations, we will 
not find them in the mechanisms underlying real-time embodied action. Why? 
Because such mechanisms realize the “dynamic systems concept of a self-
organizing continuous reciprocal causation” (Gallagher, this volume). 
Continuous reciprocal causation (as characterized by Clark, 1997) is causation 
that involves multiple simultaneous interactions and complex dynamic feedback 
loops, such that (a) the causal contribution of each systemic component partially 
determines, and is partially determined by, the causal contributions of large 
numbers of other systemic components, and, moreover, (b) those contributions 
may change radically over time. As I have argued previously (Wheeler, 2005), 
continuous reciprocal causation (CRC) undermines representational explanation 
because it undermines homuncularity; and it undermines homuncularity 
because it undermines modularity. Modularity is necessary for homuncularity, 
and thus for representation. CRC undermines modularity because, as CRC 
increases, it becomes progressively more difficult to specify distinct and robust 
causal-functional roles played by reliably reidentifiable parts of the system. The 
performance of any particular sub-task will increasingly be underpinned by 
larger and larger numbers of interacting components whose contributions are 
changing in highly context sensitive ways.  
 
Gallagher and I agree, then, that real-time action may be underpinned by CRC, 
and that where this is the case there will be no place for minimal representations. 
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Where Gallagher and I disagree is that I see no compelling reason to follow him 
in thinking that all real-time action will be underpinned by CRC. For although 
this phenomenon looks to bestow a certain kind of useful large-scale adaptive 
flexibility on a system, it is rather less obvious that it introduces a set of 
properties that make mechanistically intelligible everything that we want to 
explain about real-time embodied action. For example, it is far from obvious (to 
me anyway) that an appeal to CRC alone has the resources to account for the 
core phenomenon of adaptive sensitivity to what is relevant within a context of 
action. A more compelling picture, I think, is the one sketched in my paper in 
this volume (see also Wheeler, 2005), a picture according to which CRC mediates 
the transitions between the sorts of situated special-purpose adaptive couplings 
that individually feature the property of intrinsic context-dependence. Once 
again our old friend the fly robot indicates that some of those couplings will be 
organized into homuncular systems and will feature action-oriented 
representations. I conclude, then, that minimal representations will be associated 
with Gallagher-property 6, homuncularity.    
 
Gallagher’s timely paper challenges the fan of minimal representation to be clear 
about what of a genuinely representational character remains, once the concept 
of representation has been stripped down far enough to enable it to play a useful 
and proper role in the explanation of real-time embodied action. This is without 
doubt a serious challenge, but it is one that, I think, can be met.   
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